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DEPUTY CLERK: Can the parties starting with counsel for the plaintiff please state their appearances for the record.

MR. GERSHON: May it please the Court, my name is Arnold Gershon. With me is Mike Toomey, Michael Toomey. We are partners at Barrack Rodos & Bacine, and we represent the plaintiff Victoria Shaev in this case.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ASCHER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do we have any one here for Netscout.

MR. ASCHER: Yes, your Honor. My name is Stephen
Ascher from Jenner & Block, and we represent Netscout and the directors.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, and welcome. I don't -you may not have had a chance to put in your appearances yet.

I assume you're going to do that shortly. It may have come in today.

MR. GERSHON: We signed the sign in sheet, your Honor.

Is that sufficient?

THE COURT: No. It's all sufficient. I'm just saying for purposes of the docket, Mr. Ascher, have you already entered the proceedings formally?

MR. ASCHER: Not yet, no, your Honor.

THE COURT: But you plan to do so?

MR. ASCHER: Yes.

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THE COURT: And if I am reminded, I did in fact adopt the proposed briefing schedule on the request for emergency relief. Mr. Ascher you got that schedule, I will obviously hear you if there needs to be adjustments to that schedule.

MR. ASCHER: I did see the order, yes, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. GERSHON: Your Honor, may I be heard on one point?

In our letter requesting a briefing schedule, we included a

typo. We said July 28 instead of August 28. I don't know

whether anybody noticed it or not. We didn't until too late to

fix it.

THE COURT: Since I adopted the proposed schedule, I didn't notice it either, which is fine. We will put it in order with the correct dates just so everything is squared away, unless, Mr. Ascher, you have any responses or need any modification, which are fine with me.

Just as a technical matter -- let's first -
Mr. Ascher, I'm putting you in an unfair spot because you just entered this case and you just received these papers. But anything you'd would want to communicate to the Court before -
I have some questions that I would love the parties to chime in on, but I'll hear you first.

MR. ASCHER: Thank you, your Honor. And not unfair.

I hope to be prepared.

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I think the main thing that your Honor should know is that although we think that there was no obligation to do so, Netscout has already filed a proxy supplement disclosing precisely the information requested in the complaint.

THE COURT: The assumptions underlying the Monte Carlo simulation.

MR. ASCHER: Correct, that's exactly what we filed in a proxy supplement last Thursday. So it is our position that the case itself is moot, and the only outstanding issue is that the plaintiffs are demanding a mootness fee for bringing this to Netscout's attention. Netscout believes that the disclosures sought by the plaintiff were immaterial. It's a very technical reading of the statute, and we've agreed to —no doubt we've agreed to make a disclosure in order to moot the issue, but —

THE COURT: You mean it's a technical reading of the instruction underlying the regulation implemented in accordance with the statute? There's nothing in the statute that requires any of this, right?

MR. ASCHER: Correct. This isn't an SEC reg. S-K item 402(d).

THE COURT: Do you believe that there would be an actionable claim based on the non-inclusion of the underlying assumptions based on the language of the regulation and everything else?

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MR. ASCHER: We don't believe it was material, so we recognize that that there was an issue as to whether the information should have been disclosed, and so we are not -- we are not contesting the issue as to whether under the rule it should have been disclosed. What we do have a significant question about is materiality. We decided to moot that also by making the disclosure. And so now really, your Honor, the only issue is whether there's any authority for them to receive some sort of fee for bringing like this to our attention.

I can explain, your Honor, if it would be helpful why the disclosed information is so immaterial if you're interested in hearing about that today. That's starting to get more into the weeds, but I'm prepared to do that.

THE COURT: No, I'm happy for that to be briefed. I do have a separate question, which is, do the normal requirements that would apply concerning loss causation apply in this context despite the fact that the principal relief sought is in the form of injunctive relief? And then I'll hear everyone on this. But, obviously, there's the Rubenstein case in the Second Circuit which relates to some of these issues. There are also authorities in this district and also in California that make clear that there is pleading requirement of loss causation even in the context of a request for injunctive relief. And, Mr. Ascher, you can say I have no view, I need to phone a friend, or whatever want to say, but if

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you have any views on any of those issues, I'm just curious because I did look through the papers and with the able assistance of my law clerk did some research over the weekend, and so I was just curious about those issues.

MR. ASCHER: I understand, your Honor. So we have not focused on the issue of loss causation, the reason being that we decide to the moot the issues --

THE COURT: Yes, you just said you were going to moot--

MR. ASCER: -- and make disclosure. So from our perspective, the primary issue, which, frankly, I think might be undisputed, but maybe I'll hear differently. Let me explain why I think it should be undisputed, also, your Honor, that we've mooted this case. The same plaintiff's lawyers filed essentially the same complaint against another public company several weeks earlier seeking precisely the same types of disclosures. That company made exactly the same disclosures that -- obviously, the numbers are different, but exactly the same format of disclosures that Netscout made last week, and these plaintiffs admitted that those disclosures mooted that case and filed a voluntary stipulation of discontinuance in that case. And so my belief, your Honor, is that the only difference between this case and that case is that that issuer agreed to pay some sort of a fee to the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel and my client has not. So I think it is

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really is indisputable that this issue has been mooted, and I

think it's going to be very difficult for the plaintiff to take

a contrary view. Now, we may be briefing the issue of a

mootness fee, your Honor, and --

THE COURT: That's something that I have to approve?

I've never run into the issue of a mootness fee before.

MR. ASCHER: Sure. So I can give some background on that, your Honor.

There is quite a decent amount of case law, both in the Delaware courts and to a lesser extent in the Southern District about whether and to what extent a plaintiff's law firm is entitled to be paid their attorneys' fees, in essence, by a corporation when they bring a disclosure case. And typically that occurs, your Honor, in M&A cases in Delaware. There's, frankly, a whole industry around this. If two corporations enter into a M&A transaction, there is almost inevitably a series of disclosure cases filed by the plaintiffs' securities bar saying that in your papers in the various securities filing concerning a merger or spinoff or whatever it is, you have disclosed this thing, you should have disclosed that thing. And, historically, public companies would make those disclosures and agree to pay mootness fees. Sometimes they'd be a few hundred thousand dollars. Sometimes they'd be \$50,000, whatever.

In the last few years, the Delaware courts have

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started clamping down on those mootness fees. People have seen these cases as, you know, a form of strike suit and, if you will, a transaction tax whenever a public company tries to enter into something, and so there have been a couple of major cases coming out of Delaware in the last few years denying these fees to plaintiffs when the disclosures that their cases triggered were found to be immaterial and not to have provided the key words are "a substantial benefit" to the company and its shareholders.

There have also been a couple recent cases in the Southern District on this, your Honor. Judge Abrams and Judge Oetken have both recently issued decisions saying, you know, all well and good that you filed a case that caused a company to make some more disclosures, but really these disclosures were so insignificant, no fee should be payable. So I think that's the only issue that's left to be briefed, your Honor. I don't think it necessarily needs to be on the same timetable. but that's where we are.

THE COURT: Okay. Understood. I will turn to the plaintiff, Mr. Gershon, or Mr. Toomey. And I apologize that I started with Mr. Ascher, but given that they had not put in anything in response to your pleading, I hope you'll be okay that I started with Mr. Ascher.

MR. GERSHON: Perfectly okay with it.

My name is Arnold Gershon from Barrack Rodos & Bacine

representing the plaintiff Victoria Shaev.

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Where to start? Would your Honor prefer to start on the subject of loss causation or is that not part of the case at this time?

THE COURT: Well, you tell me if it's part of the case anymore.

MR. GERSHON: I don't think it's part of the case, but we do have loss causation in the sense that the plan if approved would result in serious costs to the company, and, furthermore, on the subject of the election of directors, we submit that there is no need to show loss causation in such a case because the statutory codification of this judge-made rule says that you must show loss causation when there is a loss for which you seek damages, and there are obviously no damages to be sought based on the election of directors. That's part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

THE COURT: Is there any case that espouses that view?

MR. GERSHON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Appreciate your candor.

MR. GERSHON: There are no cases that have actually come up that have addressed that even though the statute --

THE COURT: On the appellate level. You will agree that there are district court cases that have held that even if a case seeking solely injunctive relief, the loss causation pleading requirements still pertains.

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MR. GERSHON: Yes. And we submit that we have shown loss causation and that, in any event, to the extent that the company is seeking approval of a stock incentive plan, but to the extent that it's seeking election of directors, we submit under the statute, I think it's 15 U.S.C. 78U-4(b), 2(b) or 3(b), something like that, is where that statutory language appears.

THE COURT: But you will agree with me that just at least on say-on-pay vote, that as to that *Rubenstein* is all but dispositive. Do you have a way around *Rubenstein* given what it says?

MR. GERSHON: We submit that the same applies in this instance, and that *Rubenstein* is, of course, a summary order which is entitled to great respect, but it is not the last word on the subject, and there is no case in the Second Circuit or anywhere that we have been able to find that provides the last word on that subject when considered in light of the statutory codification of this rule that was initially laid down by Judge Oakes 40 years ago or 50 years ago, whenever he did it.

THE COURT: Let's put that to the side. Let's assume -- let's put that issue to the side for the most.

Mr. Ascher said, look, they've made these changes -- I'm not holding you to this, but at the present time, do you have any reason to disagree with Mr. Ascher that the case is moot, and the only issue left is the issue of mootness fees? If you're

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still thinking about it, that's fine, but I'm just trying to figure out kind of where we're at.

MR. GERSHON: We disagree, your Honor, and for this The case that he cites was a case that was settled. Instead of litigating it to the hilt, we decided to settle it. This case apparently we cannot settle. And here's what's wrong with that supplemental proxy statement. It states the assumptions only for the year fiscal 2024 but the regulations clearly requires that it's stated for all three years that are shown in summary compensation table, which is '24, '23 and '22, and these are regulations of the SEC. And it might address the case of Loper Bright V. Raimondo where the court held that where the Congress expressly delegates rule-making authority to define terms to the agency, that must be given respect by the court and in Loper it cited Batterton v. Francis, which is an earlier Supreme Court case, which held that the SEC's proxy rules have the force and effect of law. Accordingly, we suggest that --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask maybe a more basic question. Look, we are here on not even a motion. We are here on a proposed order to show cause for emergency relief. I guess my question is, is there still an emergency? Because I understand what you're saying about the earlier years. As I understand it, you're saying as to 2024, maybe they've corrected that. I'm sure Mr. Ascher can put in a supplement

1 | that would address these prior years too.

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My real question is, can I deny -- there's nothing for me to deny. There's no motion filed, but do we still have an emergency here, or should we have a more relaxed and normal briefing process on what remains of your case? Help me out with that.

MR. GERSHON: The plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if they go forward with the vote, and then we have to litigate whether the vote was fairly obtained. The Second Circuit in Koppel v. 4987 Corp., which is cited in our brief, said that they must prefer issues like this be resolved before the vote is taken rather than to wait until after so that plaintiff's lawyers don't have the chance to litigate forever and build up big fees. We have the exact same interest. We are trying to avoid protracted litigation.

THE COURT: Connect the dots for me. I get it. So what bearing do the 2022 and 2023 underlying assumptions have on the pending vote that's going to occur in September?

MR. GERSHON: They are required by the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission in two cases, the Second Circuit has held that where the SEC has express requirements that certain information be disclosed, the failure to include those disclosures is actionable. That's Seinfeld v. Gray and Resnik v. Swartz that are cited n our memorandum of law and support.

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I'm a five year old. Like, what does it matter? Like, why does it matter, like these disclosures about the underlying assumptions on the Monte Carlo simulation for 2022 and 2023, how does that -- just if you're speaking to like someone on the elevator, like why does it matter for the purposes of this vote? I'm not saying it doesn't like legally matter for the reasons you're saying. I'm just saying like if you're in the elevator going down. Go ahead.

MR. GERSHON: I'm about to address that. Judge Cote held in the case of 2006 called *Unite Here v. Cintas*, the uniform company. Cintas is C-I-N-T-A-S. Held that these regulations requiring the disclosures concerning the compensation of the executive officers are material because they bear on the independence of the directors who are either up for election or who have authorized this plan and therefore they are material.

THE COURT: If their compensation was through the roof, that's a reason to question their independence and whether they are good stewards of the company.

MR. GERSHON: She held that they were material, and if I may address the subject of the assumptions. The assumptions to be disclosed are the volatility and the interest rate and what we know is that the greater those numbers are for the volatility and the interest rate, the greater the cost of the

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compensation.

Now, one thing I might point out, the next out supplemental proxy statement shows that the grant date fair value is less than the price of the underlying stock on the date of grant. That should not be. It should normally be higher, and we can offer up the statements of Radford, the premier company that does Monte Carlo simulations to show that very fact. And the fact that they are less shows that something is wrong.

Now, what could be wrong? I expect my friend to say that there is no upside potential to these restricted stock performance stock unit awards, but that is not supported by the proxy statement itself which makes an ambiguous statement. On one hand, it says the threshold and the maximum are the same, but if you look at the grant date table, it shows no number is entered for the maximum possible recovery. And in that situation, the presumption is that there is no maximum. therefore they have to fix this supplemental proxy statement with an explanation of why the grant date fair value is less than the price of the underlying stock on the date of grant. And to the extent that they might say that it's part of the structure of the award, in fact we don't know what the structure of the award is because the 2024 form 10K shows as an exhibit the underlying plan, the 2019 stock incentive plan, it shows the form of a award of a regular time-based restricted

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stock unit, but it does not include the award for a performance-based restricted stock unit, and, therefore, we submit that the supplemental proxy statement is incomplete, inconsistent with the requirements of the regulations of the SEC and inconsistent with the ability to give the information that the stockholders need to determine what the value of these awards -- what the cost of the company of these awards is, the cost is expressed as grant date fair value.

THE COURT: Okay. You're not trying to hide anything from Mr. Ascher, right? All these things you think are missing, like you want to help the company so you want them to put in these supplements and just resolve this, right?

MR. GERSHON: We suggest that they should put in a supplement for the three years, and that they should explain in greater detail what assumptions they made that caused the grant date fair value to be less than the price of the stock on the date of grant.

THE COURT: That's it? If they make those changes, then victory is yours.

MR. GERSHON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ascher, you got any more questions about what they want in the proposed proxy supplement?

MR. ASCHER: I don't have more questions, your Honor.

I do have some answers if you have the patience for a little

1 | bit more.

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THE COURT: Sure. Hold on one second. Mr. Gershon, one question. Based on your experience in this, would the moot any fee you were paid if there is a dispute about that, that that becomes an issue for the Court to decide, am I right about that?

MR. GERSHON: Oh, that. In Delaware, the court wants to take a look at it, and I don't know whether they want to approve it, but they want to see it. In the federal courts, it's unclear. Some years ago we had a case before Judge Sue Robinson in the District of Delaware, and my learned friend in that case was Judge Lewis Liman, now a judge in this court, and we told Judge Robinson that we had a mootness fee, and if she wanted to disclose it, we would tell her what it is. She said, "Don't bother me with the details. Go on about your business."

On the other hand, Judge Weinstein said, "I want to look at what that fee is. And if it's okay, I'll approve it."

And we told him what the fee was in that case, and he signed off on the order without any further elaboration.

So I think your Honor has discretion --

THE COURT: In your view, is there any rule or regulation or statute that requires judicial authorization of these fees?

MR. GERSHON: We are aware of no such rule, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Let's just say for the moment that Mr. Ascher says, we've mooted this case because we've done everything that even arguably needs to be done to resolve this However, we are not going to pay you any kind of mootness fee. At that point, what remaining claim would you have to advance in this case? Would it just be a pure attorneys' fees case? MR. GERSHON: As Judge Weinstein said, you can then make a motion for a fee, but I hope you'll settle it and save

us all the trouble.

THE COURT: I'm wondering what the motion is. motion is just for attorneys' fees?

MR. GERSHON: That would be yes, under rule whatever, it is 56 something or other.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ascher, any responses?

ASCHER: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. A few things.

First of all, I did want to respond to your elevator speech question from the other perspective, of course, about why these disclosures are not material, right?

So as Mr. Gershon explained, they are seeking the assumptions used to calculate a fair value. But there is no dispute here Netscout always disclosed the fair value itself, right? That headline number was always disclosed to its shareholders. So all they're asking for is: Give us the numbers that you used to calculate the thing that you already

disclosed. So all they're asking like is if somebody has a computer at home that they could plug those numbers in and check that our math is correct. That's the level of disclosure that they're asking for. There is no question that we accurately disclosed the number of shares that were paid to these executives. There is no suggestion at this point that it was calculated inaccurately. I'll get to one issue about that later. This is literally just: Show me your math, on an issue that itself is subsidiary.

THE COURT: Just help me out with this. Anybody, like if I knew how to run Monte Carlo simulations, like I can do all of this based on the inputs, right?

MR. ASCHER: Yes.

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know the stock. I can figure out like interest rate assumptions. I can make my own assumptions, run a simulation and figure out what I think the fair value would be, right? There's nothing like secret about it. It's just that you had to run the simulation to get to a fair value. You ran the simulation. You said what the fair value is. Everyone knows you ran a Monte Carlo simulation, so they thought, well, maybe these folks are up to no good. They could just run it themselves and then figure out that it's some different number. Because you're not trying to say that you came up with the fair value through some other means. Like at the point that you say

like here is how we did it, and we made assumptions about these
various things, then that opens it up to anybody who might
disagree with that to just do it themselves if they wanted to.

Is there anything I'm missing in that?

MR. ASCHER: No, your Honor. That's probably a good segue to the second point between the three-year disclosure that they're still seeking and the one-year disclosure that we've already made. There are a few answers to that, your Honor. First of all, as I've already pointed out, they've already agreed to moot the case on the same basis.

THE COURT: What's the cost involved for doing it for an extra two years, because you've already done it for 2024. I mean, maybe there's some different numbers in there, but like--

MR. ASCHER: I don't know that there's a cost, but the second point, your Honor, is we do read the statute differently. There are some things that are required to be disclosed for three years and others for one year, and our read of item 402(d) is that this is a one-year piece.

And then the final point to be made on that, your Honor, all of this has to be material for us to be required to disclose it, right? And so the 2024 figure that we've already disclosed, that allows somebody to verify our calculation.

What point is there in giving someone information to go back and verify calculations for 2022 and 2023? That compensation has already been paid. The company has already given it to

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stockholders the information that they need for 2024. We do

those executives. It's over and done with. So we've given the

2 stockholders the information that they need for 2024. We do

maintain, your Honor, that that is exactly what the statute

requires, and certainly anything more would be immaterial.

The two other points I wanted to make, your Honor,

Mr. Gershon expressed some confusion as to why the fair value

that the company has reported is not higher. We have explained

that to him. I thought he understood it before I talked into

the room today. I think they are misreading. I think they are

just misreading the materials.

The reason it's not higher is Netscout's compensation plan is a little bit different than some other companies. Some companies have it sort of a two-way ratchet, meaning if the company's performance is above certain thresholds, the amount of stock goes up. If it's below certain thresholds, it goes down. That's how it often work. Therefore, the value can be either more or less than the current stock price.

Netscout's a one-way ratchet down, meaning they're presumptively going to get a certain amount of stock, but if they don't hit certain benchmarks, it goes down. Because of that, the valuation is lower than a two-way ratchet where you've got a chance of going up or down. So I thought we were all clear on that.

THE COURT: Am I right that you basically gave sort of the max value, and so the only thing that could happen is it

1 | can be less?

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2 MR. ASCHER: Yes.

THE COURT: And it can't be more.

MR. ASCHER: Yes. And that is all disclosed, your Honor. It's not the easiest thing to understand, but it's all disclosed.

Finally, your Honor, on the whole fee request issue,
Mr. Gershon did cite a couple of cases where federal judges,
including Judge Weinstein, have said, "Pay the fee and leave me
alone." I understand that. Those cases are kind of ancient
history in the world of mootness fees. The Delaware courts in
the first instance, and now the Southern District, have really
taken a different look at them. The Judge Abrams case and
Judge Oetken case that I mentioned are both much more recent
cases. There has been a recognition, as I said before this is
a transition tax on public companies, and it's a tax that
shouldn't be paid unless the disclosures are truly material and
provide a substantial benefit to the shareholders.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to fit that into not issuing advisory opinions because the folks upstairs told me that I'm not supposed to do that. So like what rule or regulation does this fall under? Let's assume Netscout says, "No dice. We're not playing this game. We're not paying you any mootness fees." And then Mr. Gershon comes in here and he asks me for something, what does that come under?

MR. ASCHER: I think that's the -- that is a good question, your Honor. In Delaware M&A cases, the Delaware courts have said that when the plaintiff causes, brings about a substantial benefit to other shareholders, the plaintiffs' lawyers are entitled to a fee. I think there is a substantial question as to whether that doctrine, which I see as a creature of Delaware law is applicable -
THE COURT: It's litigated in a Delaware court.

THE COURT: It's litigated in a Delaware court.

That's what I understood too.

MR. ASCHER: Yes. And I want to caution, your Honor. I haven't fully researched this issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. ASCHER: But there is a question in my mind as to whether that doctrine would apply in a federal securities case.

THE COURT: Okay. Understood.

Well, this has been very helpful. We have a briefing schedule, but based on what I have heard today, my understanding is that within the next nine days the parties are going to be working hard to see if they can resolve this case so that we don't have to continue with any further briefing given the substantial progress that both sides have made already and hopefully we've advanced the ball through the discussion today. If not, I suppose we will have a response to the proposed order to show cause on August 28. So we will put that in an order.

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Mr. Gershon, I think I have raised with you some of the questions I had about loss causation, whether that applies here. I have to say I do have a substantial question, and Mr. Ascher has picked this up on the materiality requirement in this context given the facts and circumstances involved, and the overhang, of course, is we have this issue of mootness given the supplemental proxy statement. So it may be that you will have discussions with Mr. Ascher and will decide that this is not -- you have many causes potentially involving serious materially misleading disclosures or omitted information, but maybe this isn't it. Maybe you'll tell me no, Judge, that's not the case. There is a materially misleading disclosure in this case, which I'm happy to hear your briefing. In any event, do your best over the next week or so to see if this can be resolved in a way that would not require this kind of expedited briefing which the Court never likes to be in a situation, unless it's necessary, to put people on short timetables, especially when there are important and novel and complicated legal issues to be of resolved. You understand that, right? MR. GERSHON: Very well. Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further from either side?

Mr. Gershon, anything further from you?

MR. GERSHON: Oh, we would be briefing this if we had to, but I just wanted to draw one distinction between the

1 merger cases and the instant cases. The merger cases do not 2 involve disclosures that are specifically required by any 3 agency or any government: Not the state of Delaware, not the 4 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, nobody 5 specifically requires these. And in the two cases cited in our 6 brief mentioned Reznik v. Schwartz and Seinfeld v. Gray, the 7 courts held that a disclosure is required either in one of two 8 circumstances to be material: One is if it's required to make 9 other disclosures not misleading or, two, if it is specifically 10 required that a regulations and rules of the Securities and 11 Exchange Commission, and we submit that this falls directly, exactly, precisely within those two cases. 12

THE COURT: Okay. So after you roll up your sleeve and over the next week try to resolve this, then you are going to see Mr. Ascher's response to all of that, and then you will have a chance to reply.

MR. GERSHON: Yes.

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THE COURT: Good.

Mr. Ascher, anything further on your end?

MR. ASCHER: No, your Honor. I don't know whether the PSLRA applies to this case. We will be looking at the attorney fee shifting of that provision to see if it applies, but we will submit our papers if we can't resolve it.

THE COURT: Okay. I think he was talking to you,
Mr. Gershon, in that last comment, but, you know, that's fine.

Mr. Ascher, could you do me a favor? Could you send an email to chambers, copying plaintiff's counsel, of course, and just give me the citations of those two cases, the Oetken and Abrams case that you had mentioned that sort of address this issue? I'm curious and would like to take a look.

MR. ASCHER: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further from either

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MR. GERSHON: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good look over the next week. I know you will have many fruitful discussions with each other in an earnest attempt to resolve this. If not, we will continue with the briefing. I think the one homework assignment on our end is to put in an order with the correct dates, so thank you for advising me about the typo in the letter, which we then replicated in our order.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned.

(Adjourned)

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